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Abstract: Embodying an optimistic diplomatic mind in early Joseon Dynasty, 
haidongzhuguoji written by Shin Suk-ju became a main evidence of Chinese 
official Ding Yingtai impeaching Joseon in the Jeongyu War occurring 
in 1597 because of Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s second invasion. Ding Yingtai’s 
impeachment involved Joseon’s king, Chinese generals in Joseon 
and officials in Beijing in a political maelstrom, which aroused strong 
reactions of Joseon king and ministers. In this situation, Joseon’s diplomatic 
corps were dispatched to Beijing in order to justify and defend. They made 
preparations and took action zealously, winning the final victory 
and achieving the goal consequently. However, this book-diplomacy 
surpassed the problem of justifying a book, thus there were some complicated 
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and subtle meanings in the process. Firstly, This book-diplomacy provided 
a touchstone of Sino-Korean relationship in Ming Dynasty, explaining 
the political essence of the relationship. Secondly, This diplomacy resulted 
from Ming Dynasty’s political fights and calmed down also because of Ming 
Dynasty’s political fights, intensively showing both Sino-Korean 
interdependent political fights and each liege fights. Thirdly, 
The book-diplomacy became an important turning point of the transformation 
of Joseon’s foreign concept, and Joseon’s “Smaller China” mind began 
to emphasize excluding barbarians, which made an idealistic preparation 
for the rising “Smaller China” mind in Qing Dynasty. 
 
Key words: The Jeongyu War, haidongzhuguoji, Ding Yingtai, Lee Jung-goo, 
“Smaller China”, political fight. 
 
ZAKULISOWE MACHINACJE I TRANSFORMACJE: 
CHIŃSKO-KOREAŃSKA DYPLOMACJA I WALKI POLITYCZNE 
W LATACH 1597-1599 
 
Streszczenie: Artykuł dotyczy sytuacji politycznej w Korei Jeongyu podczas 
wojny, która wybuchła w 1597. Korpus dyplomatyczny Korei został wysłany 
do Pekinu w celu negocjacji i ochrony kraju. Dyplomaci przygotowywali się 
do rozmów gorliwie, osiągając ostateczne zwycięstwo i zamierzony cel. 
Książka o dyplomacji haidongzhuguoji zawiera pewne skomplikowane i 
subtelne znaczenie. Po pierwsze, ta książka dyplomatyczna stanowiła 
fundament stosunków chińsko-koreańskich za czasów dynastii Ming, 
wyjaśniając polityczną istotę związków pomiędzy krajami. Po drugie, 
stosunki dyplomatyczne wynikały z walk politycznych za czasów dynastii 
Ming, wyraźnie pokazując chińsko-koreańskie współzawodnictwo polityczne. 
Po trzecie, książka stała się ważnym punktem zwrotnym transformacji 
koncepcji polityki zagranicznej Korei. 
 
Słowa klucze: wojna Jeongyu, haidongzhuguoji, Ding Yingtai, Lee Jung-goo, 
„Mniejsze Chiny”, walka polityczna. 
 
시금석, 배후조정자, 그리고 전환점:  
정유재란 시기 중한 간의 서적 외교와 정치투쟁 (1597-1599) 
 
신숙주의 『해동제국기』는 조선 전기의 낙관적 대외관념을 잘 
드러낸다. 그러나 도요토미 히데요시가 재차 조선을 침략한 
정유재란 시기에 이 책은 명나라 관원 정응태가 조선을 책망하게 
되는 주요한 근거가 되며, 이로 인해 조선의 왕과 신하, 정벌군 
장군, 북경 관원 모두가 정치적 소용돌이 속으로 휘말려 들어가게 
된다. 정응태의 책망은 조선 왕과 신하들의 격렬한 반응을 
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야기시켰고, 이런 상황 가운데 조선은 변론과 해명을 위해 북경에 
사신을 파견하였다. 조선 사신은 북경에서 적극적으로 계획하고 
행동하여 결국 외교적 승리를 얻어냈다. 그러나 금번의 서적 
외교는 이미 서적에 대해 해명하는 문제를 넘어서고 있었으며, 
복잡하면서도 미묘한 의미를 내포하는 것이었다. 첫째, 금번 서적 
외교는 중국과 한국이 종주국과 속국의 관계라는 것을 검증하는 
데에 있어서 시금석이 되는 것으로, 양국관계에서 정치관계의 
본성을 보여주었다. 둘째, 금번 서적 외교는 명조와 조선의 
당쟁에서 비롯되었고 마지막에도 명조와 조선의 당쟁으로 말미암아 
해결되었는데, 이때 양국 상호간에 얽혀있는 당쟁 및 군신 간의 
투쟁이 드러났다. 셋째, 금번 서적 외교는 조선의 대외 관념에 
있어서 중요한 전환점이 되었는데, 조선의 ‘소중화’ 의식에서 
‘양이’관념이 강조되기 시작하였고, 이는 청대에 고조하게 되는 
조선의 ‘소중화’ 의식의 사상적 준비기가 되었다고 볼 수 있다.   
 
 핵심단어: 정유재란, 해동제국기, 정응태, 이정귀, 소중화, 당쟁 
1. Preface 
Many scholars thought the relationship between Joseon Dynasty 
and Ming Dynasty as a typical suzerain-vassal relation, but in fact, 
there were still some complicated factors we couldn’t ignore 
in the typical relations. On the one hand, Joseon and Ming had 
a special intimate relationship. Founded in the wake of Ming Dynasty 
(1368-1644), Joseon Dynasty (1392-1910) needed Ming’s political 
approve and military protection, so every king of Joseon must 
be approved by the emperor of Ming, meanwhile, Joseon also must 
learn Chinese culture completely and had to pay tribute to Ming. 
Because of the importance of geopolitics as well, Joseon was the most 
important allied country of Ming. However, on the other hand, it was 
also fragile in Joseon-Ming relationship. The two countries usually 
had some problems even conflicts because of some issues such 
as Joseon’s kingship legitimacy, frontier problem, and the ownership 
of Jurchens and Joseon-Japan relationship.  
In this respect, there were so many complexities 
in Sino-Korean relationship during Ming-Qing Dynasties that even 
an inconspicuous incident could trigger sensitive nerves of the two 
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countries, thus “book-diplomacy”, 2  which means Joseon sent 
diplomatic corps to Beijing for disputing or correcting false records 
in some special books, was a similar incident shocking the two 
countries. In the beginning of Joseon Dynasty, Ming’s first emperor 
Zhu Yuanzhang doubted that Joseon’s first king Yi Seong-gye (King 
Taejo) not only was an anti-Ming minister’s son but also killed the last 
four kings of Goryeo Dynasty, so some Chinese official and personal 
books wrote down these records in Ming-Qing Dynasties, meanwhile, 
it caused a long diplomatic dispute about Yi Seong-gye between 
Joseon and Ming lasting more than 400 years. Only in the 16
th
 century, 
around daming huidian (大明會典 ), an important official book 
of Ming Dynasty, Joseon had spent 70 years finishing correcting Yi 
Seong-gye’s records until 1588. 
But 9 years later, in 1597, Joseon sent envoys to Beijing again 
for another book-diplomacy, which was more complicated than 
the former. Firstly, it was the first time that Joseon became a defendant 
forced to go to Beijing passively. Secondly, it was in the late 
of the Imjin War that this book-diplomacy happened, when 
Joseon-Ming allied troops tried to defeat Japanese invasion. Thirdly, 
it was because of a Joseon’s book haidongzhuguoji (海東諸國
紀,해동제국기) that this book-diplomacy happened, which involved 
of not only the triangular relationships of China, Korea and Japan 
in history, but also factional struggles of both Ming and Joseon 
in reality. Actually, it was a political incident named as “Ding 
Yingtai(丁應泰)impeaching Joseon”. 
Several scholars studied this incident, such as Marugame 
Kinsaku,
3
 Li Guangtao,
4
 Gari Ledyard,
5
 Lee Gyehwang,
6
 Heo 
Jieun,
7
 Jeong Eokgi,
8
 Suzuki Kai,
9
 Liu Baoquan,
10
 Sun Weiguo,
11
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but I’ll explain three questions never answered. Why a book 
haidongzhuguoji could cause a huge diplomacy even shocking East 
Asia? How did Joseon’s envoys finish diplomatic task in Beijing? 
What influences did this book-diplomacy exert on Sino-Korean 
relationship and respective political development? In this paper, I’ll 
focus on the role of haidongzhuguoji in the process, to explore 
the profound background and complex influence 
of the book-diplomacy, finally revealing the characteristic 
of Sino-Korean relationship during this period. 
2. Haidongzhuguoji’s Author and Motif 
What kind of book was haidongzhuguoji? Why would it cause 
shocking political and diplomatic waves on East Asian Sea? Who was 
its mysterious author?  
Shin Suk-ju(申叔舟) was the author of haidongzhuguoji. Born 
in a scholar-gentry family in 1417, Shin Suk-ju had an extraordinary 
talent when he was young and lived from King Sejong to King 
Seongjong, going through the reign of six kings. After passing 
excellently King Sejong’s imperial examination, he entered jixiandian 
(集賢殿 ), which was the highest policy advisory and academic 
research institution of Sejong, gained an important official post 
and began his brilliant political life from then on. However, Shin 
Suk-ju had several identities, he was not only a politician, but also 
a scholar, a general and a diplomat. As a politician, he was the most 
famous minister serving six kings from Sejong to Seongjong, finally 
assuming the office of prime minister of Joseon for a long time. King 
Sejo praised him as his best minister like Guan Zhong (管仲), Zhang 
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Liang (張良) and Wei Zheng (魏徵) of China.12 As a scholar, he 
compiled or wrote many important books promoting Joseon’s 
development, such as dongguozhengyun (東國正韻) teaching Korean 
to learn Chinese, Hunminjeongum (訓民正音) inventing Korean script, 
guochaowuliyi (國朝五禮儀) establishing Joseon’s ritual standard 
and haidongzhuguoji guiding Joseon to associate with Japan. 
As a general, he led troops to defeat Jurchen of maolian (毛憐 ), 
maintained northern border security and wrote some military books 
in Sejo reign. As a politician, he was highly praised by envoys 
of Ming China owing to his literary and diplomatic talents, moreover, 
he was dispatched to China and Japan in person, finally finishing 
the missions successfully and gaining more honors in East Asia, so he 
was the important minister in charge of Joseon’s relationship with 
China and Japan (久掌禮曹，以事大交鄰為己任 ). 13  Generally 
speaking, it was the reforming and developing period from Sejong 
to Seongjong, when Joseon established its regime and cultural 
foundation, so Shin Suk-ju was an important minister then who not 
only dominated Joseon’s politics but also affected East Asian 
international situation. 
After defeating Japanese pirates of Tsushima Island (己亥東
征), Joseon and Japan signed a treaty (癸亥條約), which controlled 
kinds of Japanese trade forces by means of Tsushima Island. As one 
of Joseon’s representatives, Shin Suk-ju went to Japan to sign 
the treaty, so he began to write haidongzhuguoji after repatriating 
and finally finished it in 1471. The book mainly recounted Japan (95%) 
and Ryukyu, describing Japan’s every emperor, general, island, 
official, culture, etc., therefore this book were both an comprehensive 
investigation about Japan and a reference normalizing Joseon-Japan 
trade meanwhile. Shin Suk-ju said the goal of the book was to help 
Joseon to control Japan and maintain Joseon’s marine safety.14 
Shin Suk-ju had been always worrying about Japan all his life, 
when dying in bed, the king Seongjong asked whether he had a final 
wish, and he said: “ I wish our country Joseon could live with Japan 
in peace forever.” (願國家無與日本失和) 15However, it wouldn't 
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 An Jonghwa (安锺和). 1993. 國朝人物志. Seoul; 明文堂. p. 105. The book was 
written in late Joseon Dynasty. 
13 Joseon Seongjong Sillok (朝鮮成宗實錄)卷 56，成宗六年六月戊戌條。 
14 Shin Suk-ju (申叔舟)著，Tanaka Takeo trans. 1991. Haidongzhuguoji(海東諸國
紀). Tokyo; 岩波書店. pp. 301-303. 
15 Tongwenguanzhi (通文館志). Seoul; 首爾大學校奎章閣韓國學研究院. 2006. p. 
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have occurred to him that his final wish would failed and Joseon 
would be at war with Japan for 7 years, moreover, his book 
haidongzhuguoji would worsen the war situation. 
3. Ding Yingtai Impeached Joseon by haidongzhuguoji 
In 1592, Toyotomi Hideyoshi commanded Konishi Yukinaga and Kato 
Shima to lead nearly 200,000 Japanese soldiers to invade Joseon with 
a dream of conquering Ming China, which was usually called 
the Imjin War. During less than three months, Joseon lose its two 
capitals including Seoul and Pyongyang, “Joseon almost lost its all 
land, about to cross the Yalu River to China, so Joseon dispatched 
constant envoys to Beijing for military aid. After discussion, Beijing 
imperial court thought it necessary to help Joseon because it was 
a fence of China”. 16  Consequently, Ming’s troop just defeating 
Ningxia rebellion in the west turned round to the east to help Joseon 
to resist Japan for seven years. In the process, Ming and Japan ever 
tried to negotiate peace to end the war but failed, so in 1597, Japan’s 
second invasion called the Jeongyu War took place again. Ming’s 
Emperor Shenzong punished the relevant ministers negotiating peace, 
appointed Xing Jie (邢玠), Ma Gui (麻貴), Yang Hao (楊鎬) 
as the new leaders of Ming’s troop. Just in this year, the three generals 
reached Joseon one after another to attack Japan’s troop. Yang Hao 
hold Hangang River and Taedonggang River in the west of the capital, 
suppressed Japan’s further attack, defended the military transport 
channel and removed the threat from Seoul, which was highly praised 
by Joseon’s King Seonjo and ministers. After entering Seoul 
and gaining two victories in Jishan (稷山) and Ulsan (蔚山), Yang 
Hao encountered a failure, causing many injuries and deaths in Taosan 
(島山), so Ming’s troop retreated into Seoul. But Yang Hao and Xing 
Jie reported the battle as a victory to Beijing and understated 
the casualties, which was supported by cabinet ministers such 
as Zhang Wei (張位)and Shen Yiguan (沈一貫) in Beijing. 
As a censor official along with Ming’s troop, Ding Yingtai (丁
應泰) reported Yang Hao’s failure to the emperor and accused his 
                                                                                                                                   
331. 
16
 Mingshi(明史)卷 320 朝鮮傳. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. 1974. p. 8292. 
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disguising casualties and colluding with Beijing’s ministers.17 Angry 
with Ding’s exposing, Emperor Shenzong ordered to dismiss Yang 
Hao from his post and replaced him with another general Wan 
Shide( 萬 世 德 ). 18  However, because of Joseon’s appreciation 
of Yang’s rescuing Seoul and worry about Ding’s suggestion of never 
adding soldiers and army provisions, Joseon dispatched envoys 
to Beijing to defended Yang Hao, hoping the emperor to “withdraw 
the decision, encourage Yang Hao and finish defeating Japan”. 19 
Meanwhile, twenty-three Chinese generals including Wu 
Weizhong(吳惟忠), Mao Guoqi (茅國器), Xu Guowei (許國威) also 
wrote to the emperor to defend Yang Hao and advised the emperor 
to withdraw the order for the sake of the overall situation.
20
 Actually, 
Yang Hao was impeached in the circumstance of Ming’s political 
struggles, but he was impeached strongly again by Ding Yingtai 
because of Joseon’s defending. Ding accused Yang of his order 
of building a defensing city for Joseon, which Ding thought would 
offer Joseon a chance to betray Ming. Obviously, hard to bear Joseon’s 
another defense, Ding Yingtai found a Joseon’s book haidongzhuguoji, 
thought there were some evidences of Joseon’s disloyalty to China 
and colluding with Japan. So he wrote an open letter to Ming’s 
Emperor Shenzong, in which he impeached Joseon’s king, Ming’s 
military officials in Joseon and several ministers in Beijing (属藩奸欺
有据，贼党朋谋已彰事).21 
Firstly, Ding said Joseon had been colluding and trading with 
Japan for a long time according to the book, so it was not worthy 
of Ming’s sympathy that Joseon suffered invasion from Japan. 
Secondly, Ding thought Joseon worshipped Japan and disrespected 
China, because the book wrote Japan’s reign title such as Kangzheng 
(康正), Kuanzheng (寬正), Wenming (文明) in bigger characters 
above but wrote Ming’s reign title such as Yongle (永樂), Xuande (宣
德), Jingtai (景泰), Chenghua (成化) in smaller characters below. 
Thirdly, Ding censured that Joseon was disloyal to China even 
despised China, because the book mentioned that Joseon’s kings 
unexpectedly had a posthumous title (廟號) such as jong (祖), jo (宗), 
                                                             
17 Mingshi(明史)卷 320 楊鎬傳. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. 1974. p. 6687. 
18 Mingshi(明史)卷 320 朝鮮傳. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. 1974. p. 8297. 
19 Mingshi(明史)卷 320 朝鮮傳. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. 1974. p. 8298. 
20 Joseon Seongjo sillok(朝鮮宣祖實錄)卷 102，宣祖三十一年七月癸巳條。 
21 Joseon Seongjo sillok(朝鮮宣祖實錄)卷 104，宣祖三十一年九月癸卯條。 
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which only Chinese emperor owned, moreover, Shin Suk-ju criticized 
some Chinese martial emperors such as  Emperor Wudi of Han 
Dynasty, Emperor Yangdi of Sui Dynasty. 
22
After pointing out 
the three important evidences, Ding satirized that Joseon brought 
Japan’s invasion upon itself, and transferred disasters to Ming China 
by entreating for aid, so Ding suggested reprimanding Joseon king 
and ministers together with many Ming generals in Joseon, submitted 
haidongzhuguoji to Ming imperial court and asked the court to check 
up on whether Joseon deceived Ming and whether Ming’s generals 
in Joseon collude with each other for favoritism. 
After reading Ding’s report, Emperor Shenzong immediately 
ordered to make an investigation and not to accuse each other again 
for the overall situation, but emperor didn’t change his decision 
and still hastened Wan Shide to replace Yang Hao in Joseon. 
4. Joseon’s Reaction and Lee Jung-goo’s Refuting Ding 
Yingtai 
As an intelligence agency and think tank, Seungjeongwon (承政院) 
soon collected the relevant materials including Ding Yingtai’s 
impeachment and Emperor Shenzong’s order of investigation. After 
seeing them, King Seonjo was very nervous and grieved. He decided 
to suspend him from his duties and wait for the investigation 
of Ming’s censors ( 俟 罪 待 命 ), leaving government affairs 
to the prince Gwanghaegun.
23
 But his decision made Seungjeongwon 
feel awkward, because it means a stop of Joseon’s administration. 
So Seungjeongwon told King Seonjo that Joseon should dispatch 
envoys to Beijing to explain Ding Yingtai’s false accusation according 
to the book, meanwhile Seungjeongwon also advised King Seonjo 
should retract the order of being suspended from his duties because 
it would worsen the tense atmosphere Ding Yingtai created. However, 
King Seonjo had no response. In view of this situation, prime minister 
Yu Seong-ryong (柳成龍) and many ministers of every department all 
urged King Seonjo, but Kong Seonjo insisted on his decision like 
Zhougong (周公) which also averted suspicion in Zhou Dynasty. 
                                                             
22 Joseon Seongjo sillok(朝鮮宣祖實錄)卷 104，宣祖三十一年九月癸卯條。 
23 Joseon Seongjo Sillok (朝鮮宣祖實錄)卷 104，宣祖三十一年九月癸卯條。 
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He ordered the ministers to go to Ming troop to cry and express 
complaints instead. 
But in fact, King Seonjo never really gave up his authority, 
instead he ordered envoys to go to Beijing to defend Joseon 
and guided some key steps of the book-diplomacy. Finally Joseon 
chose Lee Hangbok (李恒福), Lee Jung-goo (李廷龜) and Hwang 
Yeo-il (黄汝一) as the three responsible envoys of diplomatic corps 
to Beijing. 
There were some potential information behind Joseon’s 
reaction. Firstly, The most essential reason of the king’s abnormal 
performance was the king’s anxiety about his kingship legitimacy, 
which was threatened by Ding Yingtai’s impeachment. In Sino-Korean 
relationship and Confucian mind, Joseon king was not only the king 
and the father of Joseon people, but also the minister and the son 
of Ming emperor, because the source of Joseon king’s authority was 
from Ming emperor. Moreover, if Joseon king was not disloyal 
because of impeachment, the whole Joseon people would be also not 
disloyal.
24
 During the whole Joseon Dynasty, Neo-Confucianism 
became the most important ideological tool because it helped Korea 
gain a new social ideal, social elite and national spirit.
25
 Secondly, 
King Seonjo pretended to give up his authority but actually controlled 
the whole thing and book-diplomacy, which indicated that King 
Seonjo’s decision had some performing meaning on account 
of Confucian moral. Thirdly, Seonjo doubted how Ding Yingtai found 
the book (應泰之得此書，予甚疑之耳),26 so he would probe deeply 
into the matter. Finally, Joseon’s political struggles became more 
intense after the impeachment. At that time, the Southerners including 
premier Yu SeongRyong and Admiral Yi Sun-sin (李舜臣) controlled 
the government, but with the death of Yi Sun-sin in the final naval 
battle and Ding Yingtai’s charge, the Southerners was attacked 
by the Northerners, So Yu Seong-ryong was also forced to resign 
himself in the process. 
Lee Jung-goo refuted Ding Yingtai’s impeachments one 
by one in the diplomatic articles, which was prepared to send 
                                                             
24 Gari Ledyard, “Confucianism and War: The Korean Security Crisis of 1598”, 
Journal of Korean Studies, vol. 6 (Washington, 1988-89), pp. 96-98. 
25 Martina Deuchler, The Confucian Transformation of Korea: A Study of Society 
and Ideology, Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center for Harvard-Yenching 
Institute, 1992, pp. 92-110. 
26 Joseon Seongjo sillok(朝鮮宣祖實錄)卷 104，宣祖三十一年九月乙巳條。 
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to Beijing imperial court. Generally speaking, Lee Jung-goo expressed 
three parts of explanations to aim at Ding’s impeachments. Firstly, 
Joseon had been always regarding Japan as barbarians and beasts, 
and the goal of associating with Japan was to help China to gain 
Japan’s trends. Secondly, both haidongzhuguoji and its author Shin 
Suk-ju were negligible 100 years ago and the bigger or smaller reign 
titles should be a historical writing habit as well as China. Thirdly, 
Joseon was guilty of using the posthumous title only owned by China, 
but Joseon was so loyal completely to China that even a little boy 
admired China when just learning to speak and write (三尺孩童，才辯
一語，便知天朝).27 From Lee Jung-goo’s explanations, we could find 
some minds Joseon want to express to Ming: Ming China was 
the middle of the world and Japan was the only barbarian country 
never paying tribute to Ming China, so Joseon was the only civilized 
country really admiring Ming China. In a word, Joseon was 
a complete “Smaller China”(小中華). 
5. Envoy’s Diplomacy ＆ Beijing’s Response 
Joseon’s envoys spent three months reaching Beijing in 1599, when 
Ding Yingtai openly accused Xing Jie once again, another commander 
instead of Yang Hao, of bribing Japan to negotiate peace.
28
 It initiated 
a serious consequence, not only making Joseon and Ming’s ministers, 
censors, generals suffer a culpable accusation, but also making 
Emperor Shenzong angry. Because then Japanese troop was defeated 
back to Japan and the war had put an end, Ming imperial court was 
making preparations for declaring and celebrating victory, but Ding’s 
accusation of “bribing Japan to negotiate peace” meant that Ming 
didn’t gain a whole victory in spite of devoting 7 years, more than 
100,000 soldiers and millions of money, which would made Emperor 
Shenzong disgraced. So after receiving Ding’s accusing article, 
Emperor Shenzong didn’t give a response,29 which betokened that 
Shenzong had lost patience and confidence to Ding and Ding would 
                                                             
27 Hwang Yeo-il (黄汝一). Yinchalu (銀槎錄). Im Gi-jung (林基中) ed. 燕行錄全集
(8). Seoul: 東國大學出版部. 2001. pp. 251-254. 
28 Ming Shenzong shilu (明神宗實錄)卷 330，萬曆二十七年正月丙午條. 
29 Ming Shenzong shilu (明神宗實錄)卷 330，萬曆二十七年正月丙午條. 
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fail ultimately. 
In Beijing, Joseon envoys made great efforts to gain 
diplomatic victory. Firstly, they collected Ming’s newspapers called 
tongbao, dibao, tiben (通報，邸報，題本) or official documents 
to understand Ming’s political trends. In order to understand 
the attitude and working procedure of Ming imperial court, Joseon 
envoys tried their best to ask their translators or Chinese petty officials 
to collect those newspapers or documents, sometimes even by means 
of bribing to some officials. For example, after knowing that Emperor 
Shenzong ordered the ministry of war to discuss Ding Yingtai’s 
impeachment together with other ministers and censors from 
the newspapers or documents, envoys immediately transcribed more 
than forty Lee Jung-goo’s explanatory articles according to the format 
of each department.
30
 
Secondly, they visited several important ministers such 
as premier Shen Yiguan, justice minister Xiao Daheng (蕭大亨) 
to gain their supports. According to some handbooks about Ming’s 
ministers, Joseon envoys were informed of a fact that Shen Yiguan 
and Xiao Daheng were the most relevant and important ministers, 
so they specially visited the two ministers. In front of Shen Yiguan 
and Xiao Daheng, envoys submitted the explanatory article to them 
and told the false accusation one by one by pointing 
haidongzhuguoji.
31
 The two ministers were both willing to help 
Joseon envoys due to a realistic reason, because Ding Yingtai also 
accused them.
32
 Especially Xiao Daheng, he played an important role 
in the diplomatic activities of Joseon envoys, even personally 
instructing envoys how to defend and succeed. 
Thirdly, they distributed the refuting articles to all kinds 
of departments to win public opinion support. After knowing 
the emperor ordered the ministers to discuss, envoys transcribed 
the refuting articles day and night, very anxious to prove Joseon’s 
innocence to all departments of Ming. On the one hand, Envoys’ 
efforts made Beijing officials understand the sequence of Ding’s 
                                                             
30 Hwang Yeo-il (黄汝一).Yinchalu (銀槎錄). Im Gi-jung (林基中) ed. 燕行錄全集 
(8). Seoul: 東國大學出版部. 2001. pp. 342-343. 
31 Lee Hangbok(李恒福). Chaotianlu(朝天錄). Im Gi-jung(林基中) ed. 燕行錄全集
(9). Seoul: 東國大學出版部. 2001. pp. 61-65. 
32 Lee Hangbok(李恒福). Chaotianlu(朝天錄). Im Gi-jung(林基中) ed. 燕行錄全集
(9). Seoul: 東國大學出版部. 2001. p. 64. 
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impeachment, on the other hand, many Beijing officials became 
curious to Joseon books such as haidongzhuguoji, yudishenglan (與地
勝覽), kaoshicuoyao (考事撮要), etc., even some of which were 
presented to Beijing officials. Then Xiao Daheng was very glad to see 
some Joseon books as evidence together with haidongzhuguoji, 
he asked Joseon envoys why not usually submit these books to Ming 
China. Finally, haidongzhuguoji and guochaowuliyi, both written 
by Shin Suk-ju, were kept in the ministry of Justice as evidences 
involved.
33
 
In fact, before Joseon envoys entering Beijing, many ministers 
criticized Ding Yingtai’s false charge. For example, Xing Jie, 
commander of Ming troop in Joseon wrote a letter to Emperor 
Shenzong against Ding’s impeachment twice, mentioned Ding’s 
impeachment had triggered indignations of Joseon people even 
pastering some papers on the temple dedicated to Guan Yu to curse 
Ding, and he also accused Ding actually colluded with the doves 
including Zhao Zhigao (趙志皋 ). 34  Without doubt, after Joseon 
envoys entering Beijing and making diplomatic efforts, Shen Yiguan 
and Xiao Daheng both criticized Ding Yingtai. After a centralized 
meeting, Beijing ministers came to an agreement, submitted each view 
to the emperor, all proving Joseon’s loyalty. As the responsible 
minister of Ding Yingtai’s impeachment, Xiao Daheng submitted 
an article summarizing general opinions to Emperor Shenzong. 
He thought it was so irrational that Ding Yingtai cooked up charges 
due to his personal gain because it had caused some confusions in all 
directions, so he advised emperor to remove Ding’s post to return 
to his hometown or to come back to Beijing to receive emperor’s 
punishment. Meanwhile, he suggested that someone must be sent 
to Joseon to revoke the king in order to keep Ming-Joseon 
relationship.
35
 Consequently, Emperor Shenzong followed Xiao 
Daheng’s advice.  
A month later, Ming’s army returned to Beijing from Joseon, 
thus Emperor Shenzong published an imperial edict celebrating 
Ming-Joseon victory of defeating Japan (平倭詔), in which emperor 
                                                             
33 Hwang Yeo-il(黄汝一). Yinchalu(銀槎錄). Im Gi-jung(林基中) ed. 燕行錄全集
(8). Seoul: 東國大學出版部，2001. p. 407. 
34 Xing Jie(邢玠). 2010. Jinglve yuwo zouyi(經略禦倭奏議). Qingdao: Qingdao 
Press. pp. 113-139. 
35 Ming Shenzong shilu(明神宗實錄)卷 332，萬曆二十七年三月辛未條。 
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said:“ Ming China has been not only benevolent to rescue 
the respectful country but also martial to destroy the contemptible 
country.” (我國家仁恩浩蕩，恭順者，無困不援；義武奮揚，跳樑
者，雖強必戮！)36 
However, the matter caused by Ding Yingtai was not over. 
King Seonjo ever asked how Ding Yingtai gained haidongzhuguoji, 
so he began to probe into the matter and punished some officials 
contacting with Ding Yingtai.
37
 One year later, one enlightened 
reading book for children about Ding Yingtai appeared in Joseon, 
in which Ding was demonized as a foe of Joseon. 
6. Conclusion: Touchstone, Wirepuller and Transition 
The war is the continuation of the politics, while the diplomacy 
is the prolongation of the interior, which means that the diplomacy 
occurring in the war will reveal the essence of interior political 
struggles and international relationships. It was obvious that Japan 
wanted to establish a new East Asian political and economic order 
instead of Ming China by the Imijin War and the Jeongyu War in late 
16th century, which connected Ming, Joseon and Japan closely.
38
 
Because of Ding Yingtai’s impeachment by haidongzhuduoji, 
historical and realistic relations among the three countries became 
a sensitive problem in the war and diplomacy. But in the whole 
diplomatic process, Sino-Korean book-diplomacy around 
haidongzhuguoji had surpassed the diplomatic meaning and possessed 
a complicated and delicate significance, which was specially 
conducive to understand both Sino-Korean relationship and respective 
politics. 
Firstly, This book-diplomacy provided a touchstone 
of Ming-Joseon relationship, explaining the political essence 
of the relationship. King Seonjo’s worry about his kingship legitimacy 
and Ming’s suspicion about Joseon’s loyalty should be two keys 
                                                             
36 Ming Shenzong shilu(明神宗實錄)卷 334，萬曆二十七年四月丙戌條。 
37 Joseon Seongjo modified sillok(朝鮮宣祖修正實錄)卷 33，宣祖三十二年九月丁
未條。 
38 Kenneth M. Swope. 2007. “Perspectives on the Imjin War”. Journal of Korean 
Studies (Vol. 12, No. 1). p. 160. 
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of the book-diplomacy. Gari Ledyard pointed out Joseon king 
performed the Confucian morals when in the war, but the essence 
of these Confucian morals was the anxiety for kingship legitimacy. 
Moreover, from the beginning to the end, Ming China never stopped 
suspecting Joseon’s loyalty, today Ding Yingtai doubted Joseon would 
collude with Japan in 1598, while tomorrow Xu Guangqi (徐光
啟)would also doubt and accused that Joseon would colluded with 
Jurchen in 1619. 
      Secondly, This diplomacy resulted from Ming Dynasty’s 
political fights and calmed down also because of Ming Dynasty’s 
political fights, intensively showing both Sino-Korean interdependent 
political fights and each liege fights. Why could a petty censor Ding 
Yingtai accuse so many people from Joseon king to main ministers, 
other censors and generals? It was just because he got supports from 
two powers. One was the support of Ming’s doves, which realized that 
Ming China became weaker because of saving Joseon and Jurchen 
rising in the northeast. The other one was the support from Emperor 
Shenzong, who ever openly praised Ding Yingtai in order to use his 
impeachment to control the ministers.
39
 
Thirdly, The book-diplomacy became an important turning 
point of the transformation of Joseon’s foreign concept. In Shin 
Suk-ju’s era, Joseon had an optimistic confidence in East Asia, but 
in Lee Jung-goo’s era, Joseon became very pessimistic, guilty 
and worried about weaker Ming and stronger Jurchen. So this book 
diplomacy amended Joseon’s diplomatic mind in the era of Shin 
Suk-ju, Joseon’s “Smaller China” mind began to emphasize excluding 
barbarians, which made an idealistic preparation for the rising 
“Smaller China” mind in Qing Dynasty. 
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